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CHANNARY KHUN, SAJAL LAHIRI and SOKCHEA LIM∗

We analyze the demand behavior of adoptive parents in the U.S.A. For the theory, we
apply vertical product differentiation to characterize the demand for domestic private,
foster care and international adoptions. Then, we use the 2007 U.S. National Survey
of Adoptive Parents and apply the control-function approach to a mixed logit model.
We find interesting insights into the relationship between adoption choices and an
adoptive parent’s preferences over gender, race, and special needs. The government
needs to pay an additional $735 ($506) a month to make a parent feel indifferent between
international (domestic private) and foster care adoptions. (JEL O12, D10, L13)

I.

needs. Moreover, they are of older age, belong
to ethnic minority groups, and are with physical
and/or psychological disabilities (Barbell and
Freundlich 2001; Bernal et al. 2007). In 2011,
special needs adoptions accounted for over 84%
of public adoptions in the United States and
Puerto Rico (U.S. Children’s Bureau, 2011).
According to the Stoltzfus (2018), the federal
government’s budget for Title IV-E foster care
and permanency totaled $8.2 billion and might
increase by $111 million to more than $8.3
billion in 2018.1 Of all the increases, spending
on adoption assistance and kinship guardianship
assistance were expected to increase by $195
million, while obligations for foster care were
projected to decline by $85 million. It appears
that the government is increasing spending on
programs that help foster children to get permanent homes rather than on caring for them at
foster care facilities. This could mean getting
permanent homes for those kids is the ultimate

INTRODUCTION

The fact that the demand for foster care
adoption in the United States is far less than its
supply should not come at a surprise. According
to the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and
Reporting System, merely 33% of all adoptable
children in foster care achieved permanency
in 2011 as compared to 28% a decade ago,
despite increasing efforts from federal and
state governments to encourage adoptive placement (Hansen 2007). The challenges lie in the
attributes inherent in foster children (Blackstone
et al. 2008; Landes and Posner 1978). Typically,
foster children are more likely to be abused
or neglected, and many of them have special
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goal of the government and the welfare gains
from doing so outweigh the costs.
While there are over 100,000 children in
foster care system waiting to be adopted each
year, many prospective parents prefer other
adoption alternatives. This reality is reflected
in the observed excess demand for domestic
private and cross-border adoptions (Children’s
Bureau 2012; Graff 2008). In 2004, the number
of children adopted globally by U.S. parents
peaked at about 23,000 which is approximately
half of all international adoptions worldwide
(Selman 2006). The high demand leads to prolonged waiting time, ranging from 2 to 4 years
for domestic private, and 10 months to 2 years for
international adoptions, respectively. In addition,
the monetary costs for private adoptions can be
substantial: these are estimated to be between
$5,000 and $40,000 for domestic private adoptions and $7,000 and $30,000 for international
adoptions, as compared to less than $2,500 for
public adoptions (Bernal et al. 2007). Similar
to domestic private adoptions, the majority of
U.S. international adoptions from many sending
nations are of relinquished infants. In Guatemala,
for instance, relinquished babies constituted 98%
of U.S. adoptions from that country in 2007
(Graff 2008).
There are only a few theoretical studies that
analyze the phenomenon of child adoption,
and those examine domestic public adoptions
(Blackstone et al. 2008; Boudreaux 1995; Landes and Posner 1978) and domestic private
adoptions (Balding 2010) in isolation. Khun
and Lahiri (2017), on the other hand, model the
supply of adoptable children in international
markets. However, observed child adoptions in
the United States, as discussed above, point to
the existence of some degree of substitutability
among alternatives. Furthermore, holding all else
constant, it is plausible that prospective parents
would always prefer a child with more “desirable
attributes” relating to health, age, race, and so on.
On the other hand, the presence of heterogeneity
in households’ income implies different willingness to pay by different households, and hence
diverse adoption choices. In addition, disparity
in child attributes offered by each adoption alternative renders adoption agencies some market
power. Thus, considering all these, analyzing
demand under a unified framework is crucial
for understanding the observed phenomenon of
child adoption in the United States. In particular,
the observed behavior can be elucidated under
the framework of vertical product differentiation.

Just as in the theoretical literature on adoptions, the existing empirical literature examining
demand factors in child adoptions is sparse. Baccara et al. (2014), for instance, look at the preferences for child attributes in U.S. private adoptions, while many others investigate the effect of
monthly subsidy on the demand for public adoptions (e.g., Avery and Mont 1992; Hansen 2007;
Hansen and Hansen 2006). Others explore the
substitutability between the demand for foster
care adoptions and that for assisted reproductive
technology (e.g., Cohen and Chen 2010; Gumus
and Lee 2012). Khun and Lahiri (2017) investigate the effects of income and household size
in sending countries on the level of U.S. crossborder adoptions.
The present study is the first attempt to model,
both theoretically and empirically, the demand
for child adoptions, which is particularly relevant for current policy discussions. First, we
examine the characteristics of adoption demands
and the extent of substitutability among adoption alternatives under the framework of vertical product differentiation. We do not consider
a child as a product; rather the framework is
used to identify different agencies offering a
child with different characteristics for adoption.
Prospective adoptive parents adopt a child from
either public adoption (foster care) or private
adoption. For private adoption, the parents can
adopt either domestically or internationally. Parents who adopt from foster care receive some
subsidy, while any adoption from private agencies incurs additional costs associated with waiting time. These parents derive utility from the
consumption of goods and services and from the
adoption of a child. By calculating the levels of
income at which a parent is indifferent between
public and private adoptions and between no
adoption and public adoption, we derive the standard downward-sloping demands for these two
types of adoption alternatives. We also assume
that there are also two types of adoption agencies, public and private: the public agent operates
domestically, while the private agent operates
both domestically and internationally. Under this
framework, we investigate the effect of one of the
important tools of federal policies—subsidy for
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foster care adoptions—and of prolonged waiting time.2 The comparative statics results show
that as adoption subsidy is increased to encourage foster care adoption, its demand increases at
the expense of the other two alternatives. Also,
an increase in the opportunity cost associated
with waiting time decreases adoption demand
through the private system, while increasing public adoption.
The main part of the paper carries out an
empirical analysis based on the 2007 National
Survey of Adoptive Parents (NSAP), the first
and the only nationally representative sample of
adopted children in the United States. We apply
a discrete choice regression model to jointly estimate demand for three alternatives: international,
foster care, and domestic private adoptions. The
richness of the data allows us to examine both
the characteristics of a child and those of adoptive parents. Our analysis accounts for potential
correlations in unobserved utility across alternatives by utilizing a mixed logit model, and
addresses the possibility of endogeneity of the
price variable with the use of the control function approach. Our empirical results unambiguously derive the conventional downward-sloping
demand curves for child adoptions across different income groups, with the higher income group
being less sensitive to price increases. The results
also provide evidence in support of our theoretical predictions. Adoptive parents are less likely to
adopt special needs children from private agencies than foster care facilities. Evaluating at the
average age of special needs children of 2.5 years
old, we calculate that the government needs to
pay an additional $735 a month to make a parent
indifferent between international and foster care
adoptions or an additional $506 a month to make
a parent indifferent between domestic private
and foster care adoptions. This subsidy payment
could increase with the age of the special needs
child and/or with time the child has spent in a
foster care facility. According to Zill (2011), for
the fiscal year 2010, the total of maintenance and
administrative costs per child per year in foster
care facilities was estimated at $25,782, while the
total of adoption assistance payments and administrative costs per child per year was estimated

at $10,302.3 Based on these estimates, our proposal for increased subsidy would still cost less to
the government to get a 2.5 year-old special needs
child adopted than keeping the child in the foster
care facility.
The results also show that a longer waiting time reduces the probability of international
adoption. Adoptive parents who adopt from an
international market are willing to spend an additional $311 to reduce the waiting time by 1
day. In addition, the evidence also suggests that
there is a preference for boys over girls in the
domestic private market, and that prospective parents who want to adopt a boy are more likely
to go to a domestic private agent than a foster
care agent, paying an additional cost of more
than $20,000. Between the two domestic options,
there is no evidence of any difference in transracial adoptions. However, adoptive parents who
want to adopt a transracial child are more likely
to adopt outside the United States, paying more
than $160,000 relative to a foster care adoption.
The study contributes to the literature and to
the current public policy debate related to child
adoptions in many ways. First, the study is the
first to model the demand for child adoption, considering all of the three adoption choices in a unified framework. We provide both theoretical and
empirical analyses on the issue. Second, in addition to the characteristics of adopted children, the
study is also the first to consider the characteristics of adoptive parents, which has not been studied in the adoption literature. Finally, the model
provides estimates of the effects of adoption subsidy and of the opportunity cost of waiting time. It
also examines adoptive parents’ preferences over
gender and race, which are useful for public policy discussions.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section II
presents the theoretical analysis of adoption
demand. An empirical investigation forms the
subject matter of Section III. Section IV discusses parents’ willingness to pay, preferences
over gender, race and special needs, and adoption
subsidy. The robustness tests are carried out in
Section V. Finally, some concluding remarks are
given in the last section.

2. Although adoption assistance may take many forms
including, but not limited to, monthly payment for the ongoing expenses associated with caring for the child or onetime reimbursement at the time of adoption, our theoretical
analysis focuses on the latter assuming that adoptive parents
internalize all the relevant pecuniary cost and benefit of upbringing the child.

3. These figures were calculated from state and federal
costs under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, excluding
the allocations of Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, and Food Stamps.
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II.

THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

In this section, we develop a very simple theoretical framework that unifies parents’ different
adoption alternatives. The model is constructed
based on a product differentiation framework
similar to that of Shaked and Sutton (1982).
A. The Basic Framework
Adoptive Parents. The model features a continuum of adoptive parents identical in consumption and adoption preferences but differing in
incomes, which are uniformly distributed over
the interval [0, 1]. Prospective adoptive parents
adopt a child from one of the alternatives: no
adoption, public adoption (foster care) or private adoption. We denote the attribute of a child
offered for adoption by q, where q = 0, 1, 2, representing no adoption, public adoption, and private adoption, respectively. We assume that for a
given cost and household income, adoptive families exhibit a preferences for private over foster
care adoption.4 We also assume a utility function
similar to the ones in Pliskin, Shepard, and Weinstein (1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982):
(1)

U(c, q) = c.uq ,

where c is the consumption of goods and services, uq is the subutility received from adopting
a child with attribute q. We have assumed that
u2 > u1 > u0 .
Adoption, whether public or private, involves
investment in time and money. We denote by pq
the agency cost incurred by families for adopting a child with attribute q with the assumption
that p2 > p1 > p0 = 0. We denote y as household
income and additional cost associated with waiting time (γ) is taken to be proportional to household income where 0 < γ < 1. That is, additional
cost associated with waiting time is γy when
q = 2, and is normalized to zero when q = 1. Parents who adopt from the public facility receive
subsidy (s).
We define an income level y0 such that an
adoptive parent is indifferent between no adoption and public adoption. That is, at the income
y0 , we have:
U(y0 , q0 ) = U(y0 − p1 + s, q1 ).

Using (1) and then solving for y0 , we get:
(p1 − s)u1
.
u1 − u0

We further define an income level y* such that
an adoptive parent is indifferent between private
and public adoptions. That is, at the income y*,
we have:
U(y∗ − p2 − γy∗ , q2 ) = U(y∗ − p1 + s, q1 ).
Using (1) and then solving for y*, we get:
(3)

y∗ =

p2 u2 − (p1 − s)u1
.
u2 (1 − γ) − u1

The denominators of Equations (2) and (3)
represent utility premia of public and private
adoptions, respectively, while the numerators
reflect additional costs associated with it. Given
adoption prices and associated utilities, adoptive parents with income y0 < y < y* obtain
greater utility from public adoption than no
adoption, that is, (u1 − u0 )y > (p1 − s)u1 ; thus,
they prefer public adoption to no adoption.
Those with income y > y* obtain greater utility
from private adoption than public adoption,
that is, [u2 (1 − γ) − u1 ]y > p2 u2 − (p1 − s)u1 ;
thus, they prefer private adoption to public
adoption. In other words, families with income
y0 < y < y* make up the demand for public
adoptions and those with income y > y* make
up the demand for private adoptions while the
remaining families constitute no adoptions.
Therefore, we can derive the inverse demand
functions for public and private adoptions as
follows:
u − u0
u − u0
(4) p1 = − 1
D1 + 1
(1 − D2 ) + s,
u1
u1
(5)
p2 =

(1 − γ)u2 − u0
u − u0
(1 − D2 ) − 1
D1 ,
u2
u2

where D1 and D2 denote public and private adoption demand, respectively.
The waiting time, γ, in Equation (5) is endogenous. To be specific, we assume that the waiting
time is reduced with greater supply of children for
adoption. We assume a simple linear relationship
between waiting time and the number of children
offered for adoption:
(6)

4. This assumption reflects the fact that U.S. market for
foster care adoption is characterized by excess supply when
there is excess demand for private adoption.

y0 =

(2)

γ = −φD2 + ϕ,

where φ > 0 is a parameter that relates the
number of children and the waiting time and
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0 < ϕ < 1 represents an exogenous shock which
may include foreign governments’ policy to
restrict adoption, causing the delay in the
adoption process.
Note that the demand functions are
downward-sloping with the negative own
price effect and the cross price effect is positive, indicating the substitutability of adoption
alternatives.5
Adoption Agencies. We also assume that there
are two types of adoption agencies, public and
private. Public agencies (foster care facilities)
operate domestically to provide adoption of foster care children while private agencies operate in
both domestic and international markets. We further assume an integrated international market for
private adoption. Generally, adoption agencies
are nonprofit organizations who care about the
welfare of the parents. However, their operations
also incur costs which need to be minimized. To
reflect these, we assume that these adoption agencies maximize an objective function which is a
weighted sum of profits and consumers’ surplus.6
The objective functions are given by:
(7)

V1 = p1 x1d − C1 (x1d ) + θ1 S1 (p1 ),

(8)
f
f
V2 = p2 (x2d + x2 ) − C2 (x2d + x2 ) + θ2 S2 (p2 ),
where xqi represents the number of children with
characteristic q where q = 1, 2 made available for
adoption domestically (i = d) or internationally
(i = f ), and at the equilibrium x1d = D1 and x2d +
f
f
x2 = D2 with x1 assumed to be zero (i.e., there are
no foster care, international adoptions). Cq is the
cost function which is assumed to satisfy Cq′ > 0
and Cq′′ > 0. Sq is the consumers’ surplus with
dSq = −Dq dpq , and 0 < 𝜃 q < 1 is the weight on
consumers’ surplus.
The optimal behavior of each agency implies
the following first-order conditions7 :
(9)

(1 −

∂p1

θ1 ) d x1d
∂x1

+ p1 −

∂C1
∂x1d

= 0,

5. See Appendix A for the proof of the downward-sloping
demand functions.
6. Note that the mixed oligopoly literature takes this
approach, where the government partially owns one of the
firms (see, e.g., Matsumura 1998; Kopel 2015).
7. The second-order conditions are given by (1 −
( ∑ ) ∂2 p
∂pq
∂2 Cq
q
i
θq )
i 2 + (2 − θq ) i −
i 2 < 0 for i = d, f and
i xq
∂(xq )

q = 1, 2.

∂xq

∂(xq )
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(
)
∑
∂C
(1 − θ2 ) i
x2i + p2 − i2 = 0,
∂x2
∂x2
i
∂p2

(10)

i = d, f ,
where from (4) and (5), we have
∂p1

(11)

∂x1d

=−

u1 − u0
,
u1

(12)
∂p2

)
(
∑
(1 − γ)u2 − u0
i
=−
+φ 1−
x2 ,
u2
∂x2i
i
i = d, f .

The inverse demand functions (4) and (5),
together with the first-order conditions (9) and
(10) determine the equilibrium values of prices
and the number of children adopted from each
alternative as a function of s and ϕ. This completes the description of the basic framework. The
comparative statics exercises provide two important propositions.8
Proposition 1. An exogenous increase in public
adoption subsidy has the following effects: (i) it
raises foster care adoption while lowering the
level of private adoption, and (ii) the price of
public adoption goes up, but that of private one
goes down.
Proposition 2. A policy shock that causes longer
waiting time in the private market leads to a
higher level of public adoption, a lower level
of private adoption, a lower price of private
adoption, and a higher price of public adoption.
The above results are intuitive, and explanations are omitted to save space.
III.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In this section, we first discuss the model used
to estimate the demand for adoption equations.
We explain in detail how we address a possible
endogeneity problem and the presence of correlations in utility over alternatives. The construction
of some of the variables is presented, and finally,
we discuss the estimated results.
8. The derivation of the comparative statics is provided in
Appendix B.
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A. Model Specification
Given the nature of our data, we specify a
discrete choice model to estimate the demand
for adoption equations. The equations are also
used to test the two propositions derived in the
preceding section. Three unordered alternatives
j are considered available to adoptive parents:
(1) international adoption, (2) domestic foster
care adoption, and (3) domestic private adoption.
We shall take foster care adoption as the base
group. Denoting by Y m the adoptive parent m’s
chosen alternative i, the standard logit model
(McFadden 1974) is given by
(13)

P(Ym = i) =

eUmi
,
Σ3j=1 eUmj

where
(14) Umj = λcpricemj + χcpricemj × incomem
+ βXmj + cSm + umj ,
U mi being the utility that an adoptive parent
m obtains from alternative i, and this consists
of observed and unobserved components.9 We
provide brief descriptions of the variables here,
while details are presented in the next subsection.
Specifically, cpricemj represents the consumer
price of adoption, that is, net adoption cost
including agency fees, traveling expenses and
legal fees, present value of future expenses
on the adopted child, and (minus) the present
value of monthly subsidies. Additionally, we
allow consumer price to vary by five income
levels of adoptive households. The interaction
term, cpricemj × incomem , captures different
price effects across these income groups. X mj
is a vector of a child’s observed attributes.
Sm is the observed characteristics of adoptive
parents. umj is the unobserved utility, which
is normally assumed to be independent of the
observed variables in a standard logit model. In
our case however, this assumption of independence is not appropriate because the consumer
price of adoption is endogenous in consumerlevel demand models. For example, omitted or
unobserved attributes in an adoption alternative may simultaneously affect its utility and
price, thus causing a correlation between price
cpricemj and unobserved utility umj . In order
to deal with this issue, we utilize the control
function approach (see Petrin and Train 2010;
Train 2003). Train (2003) contends that a part of
9. Supposedly, U mj is similar to uq in the theory section.

the price that cannot be explained by observed
attributes contains information about the value of
the unobserved attributes. This method involves,
first, to regress consumer price for each chosen alternative against observed attributes and
alternative-specific instruments:
(15)

cpricemj = ω0 + ω1 Xmj + ω2 Smj
+ ω3 Zn + residmj ,

where X mj and Smj are vectors of variables defined
earlier. Z n represents a vector of instruments,
where the subscript n denotes sending countries.
Petrin and Train (2010) suggest that aggregate
variables (e.g., aggregate demographics) can
serve as extra instruments to estimate the disaggregate demand functions because they correlate
with the market price and are independent of
both error terms (i.e., residmj and umj ). In our
case, information on the geographical location of
respondents (i.e., the name of the states of their
residence) is unavailable due to reasons of confidentiality. However, our data can identify the
country from which a child was adopted in the
case of an international adoption and the United
States. Thus, time-varying macro variables or
those varying by sending countries can be plausible instruments. We elect to use consumer price
index (CPI) as an instrument for all alternatives
in addition to sending country dummies for
international adoptions. The main identification
assumption is that these variables do not directly
affect individual demand except through their
impact on cprice.10 The error terms, residmj , are
factors that affect cprice, but are not captured
by regressors, thus representing unobserved
attributes. Thus, we can obtain the predicted
values of residmj for each chosen alternative by
regressing Equation (15) using ordinary least
squares (OLS) (Petrin and Train 2010). Then,
these predicted residuals are included individually in the second-stage demand equations as
explanators. The utility is now re-written as
(16) Umj = λcpricemj + χcpricemj × incomem
+ βXmj + cSm + θresidmj + ϵmj ,
where umj in (14) is replaced with 𝜃residmj + 𝜖 mj .
Given the nature of the problem at hand, there
is another problem with the above formulation.
10. Consider two households with similar characteristics
who live in the same state but decide to adopt a child in
different markets. Part of the price difference that drives the
decisions of the two households can be attributeable to the
difference in the cost of living of sending countries.
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That is, the model does not capture possible correlations in utility over alternatives. This is typically called the property of independence from
irrelevant alternatives (iia). The iia property states
that the probability of choosing alternative i over
alternative l should be independent of the existence and attributes of any other alternatives. In
other words, a change in the attributes of one
alternative affects other alternatives proportionally, so that the ratio of their probabilities remains
unchanged (Brownstone and Train 1999). While
this substitution pattern is realistic in some situations, it might not in our context. Consider, for
example, a moratorium on international adoption
in the United States. The model predicts that the
demands for both foster care and domestic private
adoptions will experience proportional increases.
However, as international adoption offers children with attributes (i.e., age, health) closely
related to those adopted through domestic private adoption, one might expect that in this case
the probability of domestic private adoption rises
by a greater proportion than that of domestic
foster care adoption. To allow for correlations
in unobserved utility among domestic adoptions
(i.e., domestic private and domestic public adoption), and among private adoptions (i.e., international and domestic private adoption), we employ
Train’s (2003) mixed logit model and the utility is
specified as
(17) Umj = λcpricemj + χcpricemj × incomem
+ βXmj + cSm + θresidmj
+

2
∑

φh km djh + ϵmj .

h=1

Two error components, km djh , are added to (16)
where h is a nest which is 1 for domestic adoption and 2 for private adoption, and djh is a binary
variable taking value one for j falling in nest h
and zero, otherwise. φh is the coefficient of the
error component, reflecting the degree of correlations among the alternatives, and km ’s are iid
standard normal deviates. For the standard logit
model, km ≡ 0. With this addition, we can then
estimate a mixed logit model which allows correlations over alternatives depending on the distribution of k. Let f (k|𝜂) denote the density of the
distribution of k, where 𝜂 is the fixed parameter
of the distribution. Then, the choice probability
becomes:
(18)

P(Ym = i) =

eUmi +φkdi
f (k|η)dk.
∫ Σ3 eUmj +φkdj
j=1

1763

Because k is not given, the choice probability
is the integral of the logit formula over all values of k weighted by its density, f (k|𝜂). The
integral does not have a closed-form solution
in general, and thus it is solved using an iterative simulation. For a given value of 𝜂, a value
of k is drawn from the standard normal density and the logit method is applied. The process is repeated for numerous draws, and the
results are averaged to obtain the simulated probability. We use 250 Halton (1960) draws, which
are found to out-perform independent random
draws (Bhat 2001; Hensher 2001; Munizaga and
Alvarez-Daziano 2001; Train 2000, 2003).11
B. Data
This paper utilizes data from NSAP, the first
and only nationally representative survey of U.S.
adoptive families across adoption types.12 The
survey is conducted through a complex sample
design involving clustering within households
and stratification by state. The NSAP sample is
composed of all children who are identified as
adopted and living in English-speaking households, except for children living with both an
adoptive parent and a biological parent (those
children were most likely adopted by a step parent, and they were excluded from the NSAP).
A random digit-dial telephone survey was conducted and 74.4% completed the survey. The
completed sample consists of 2,089 children aged
0–11 and older (up to 17), who were adopted
through international, U.S. foster care, or domestic private adoptions. There is approximately the
same number of cases across the three chosen
alternatives. There were 545 children adopted
internationally, 763 adopted through foster care
and 781 adopted in the domestic private market. The survey was conducted between 2007
and 2008 which covers children who have been
adopted since 1990 and contains information,
in categorical or binary form, on adoptive parents’ characteristics as well as on the attributes
of adopted children.
The data are conducive to the analysis of
adoption demand in general, and to achieving
the objective of the current study in particular for a number of reasons. First, it surveys
11. See Hole (2007) for the Stata commands used for
the estimations.
12. The questionnaire, data set, data dictionary and the
guidelines for data users can be accessed at https://www.cdc
.gov/nchs/slaits/nsap.htm (accessed on February 23, 2012 and
recently on October 26, 2019).

14657295, 2020, 4, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecin.12904 by John Carroll University, Wiley Online Library on [18/10/2022]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License

KHUN, LAHIRI & LIM: CHILD ADOPTION

ECONOMIC INQUIRY

parents adopting from various alternatives, permitting the analysis of demand under a unified
framework. Second, as far as this study is concerned, it encompasses a wide range of crucial
survey questions including those on adopted children’s and adoptive parents’ characteristics, the
cost of adoption, and adoption subsidy. These are
indispensable microlevel variables that cannot be
accounted for in studies based on aggregate data
(e.g., Bernal et al. 2007; Cohen and Chen 2010;
Hansen and Hansen 2006). Finally, the fact that
adoptions from different time periods are identified makes it possible for the study to incorporate
essential macro instruments, although the geographical locations of respondents are not made
available due to concerns of confidentiality.
Table 1 shows some of the characteristics of
the adopted children across the three chosen alternatives. American families adopted fewer boys
than girls from other countries while gender mix
was approximately the same for both foster care
and domestic private adoptions. Out of all internationally adopted children, only 33% were boys
and the most adopted kids were Asians, followed by Caucasians and Hispanics. There were
very few Black children and children of other
races adopted internationally. The main destination country for these adoptive parents was China
followed by Russia, Guatemala, and South Korea.
For domestic adoption, most adopted children
were Caucasians, 48% from foster care and 59%
from private adoption, followed by Blacks, other
non-Hispanics and Hispanics. There were only
six Asian children adopted from foster care and
only five adopted through private agents. These
data show that there seem to be distinct choices
of the alternatives between domestic and international adoptions in terms of the race characteristics of the adopted children. This supports our
use of mixed logit rather than the standard logit
regression method, given the closer substitutability between foster care and private adoptions than
between foster care and international adoptions.
There are other important characteristics to
note. More than half of the children adopted from
foster care had special needs, while only 28%
of international adoptions and one-third of private adoptions had special needs. Most of the
kids were adopted as babies. More than 70%
of children adopted from international markets
and more than 60% of private adoptions were
under the age of one, while only 35% of foster care adoptions were kids less than a year
old. More than 70% of those who were adopted
through foster care received monthly subsidy.

TABLE 1
Child Characteristics Across Three Chosen
Adoption Alternatives
Adoption Alternatives

Cases

(2)
Foster
Care
763

(3)
Domestic
Private
781

33.21%
28.44%
80.92%

49.54%
50.98%
26.87%

51.09%
33.80%
20.87%

102
131
22
273
17

94
367
189
6
107

96
458
117
5
105

219
166
55
38
26
21
9
9

151
118
100
73
106
78
81
50

404
90
45
35
67
52
44
37

(1)
International
545

Child characteristics
Male
Special needs child
Transrace
Race (cases)
Hispanic
Caucasian
Black
Asian
Other
Age (cases)
0 years
1 year
2 years
3 years
4–5 years
6–7 years
8–10 years
11 years and older
Child’s country of origin
China (Mainland)
Russia
Guatemala
South Korea
Africa
Other Asia
Europe
Central America
South America
Child monthly subsidy
$0
$0–300
$301–400
$401–500
$501–600
$601–750
$751–1,000
More than $1,000
Adoption cost
$0
Less than $5,000
$5,000–10,000
$10,001–15,000
$15,001–20,000
$20,001–25,000
$25,001–30,000
$30,001–35,000
$35,001–40,000
More than $40,000

165
92
62
51
16
62
40
12
30
223
74
91
83
62
54
42
18
7
35
63
139
119
65
49
27
21

403
189
70
80

280
106
95
64
34
25
14
7
8

Notes: Transrace is whether the child’s race/ethnicity differs from that of both parents (or differs from that of the single
parent) or not. Adoption cost includes a home study, travel,
and legal fees. Parents who answered no cost for international
and private adoptions were dropped. There are 8 observations for international adoptions and 124 for domestic private
adoptions. The adoption cost for foster care is adjusted by
reimbursements. There are 43 households receiving full reimbursements and 64 receiving some reimbursements.
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TABLE 2
Parent Characteristics Across Three Chosen Adoption Alternatives
Adoption Alternatives

Cases
Parent characteristics
Already have kids
Couple
Friend used to adopt
Employer’s assistance
Know prior adoption
Full-time employed
Income (cases)
At or below 100% poverty level
Above 100%–200% poverty level
Above 200%–300% poverty level
Above 300%–400% poverty level
Above 400% poverty level

(1)
International
545

(2)
Foster Care
763

(3)
Domestic Private
781

49.91%
75.78%
79.08%
17.65%
3.49%
88.62%

54%
64.48%
44.43%
6.58%
41.94%
72.48%

36.75%
60.82%
39.05%
11.17%
42%
69.53%

2
23
58
84
335

68
136
156
99
255

91
109
127
98
309

Notes: In this survey, each household is interviewed about an adopted child. Thus, each case represents each household as well
as each child. The variable “Already have kids” is related to the question “Any other children living in household?” The variable
“Couple” is related to the question “What is your relationship to [S.C.]’s other adoptive parent who lives in this household?”
Couple takes value 1 for (1) spouse/husband/wife and (2) partner/boyfriend/girlfriend and zero otherwise. The variable “Friend
used to adopt” is related to the question “Did any of your [or your spouse’s/partner’s] friends or acquaintances adopt in the same
manner [foster care/international/private adoption] as you did?”. The variable “Employer’s assistance” is related to the question
“At the time of S.C.’s adoption, did your [or your spouse’s/partner’s] employer provide financial assistance for the adoption?” The
variable “Know prior adoption” is related to the question ‘Did you [or your spouse/partner] know [S.C.] before you considered
adopting [him/her]?” The variable “Full-time employed” is related to questions “Last week were you and/or your spouse/partner
working full time, working part time, temporarily not working, unemployed, retired, going to school, keeping house, or something
else?” The variable takes value 1 if both or either of the parents worked full time and zero otherwise.

The subsidy ranges from a category of less
than $300 to more than $1,000. The recipients
seemed to be uniformly distributed among the
first three categories, roughly 10% receiving less
than $300, $300–$400, or $400–$500, and only
2% received more than $1,000. These characteristics show a closer substitutability between
international and private adoptions than between
domestic private and foster care adoptions.
The most important variable is the adoption
cost which includes a home study, travel, agency
and legal fees. There are nine categories involving positive costs and one category of no cost.
More than 50% of foster care adoptive parents
paid no cost of adoption while about a quarter of
them paid less than $5,000. The maximum cost
of a foster care adoption was less than $15,000
whereas about 50% of international adoptive parents paid between $15,000 and $25,000, 26% in
the $15,000 and $20,000 category and 22% in
the $20,000 and $25,000 category. There were
21 cases of international adoptions in which parents paid more than $40,000. While the cost of
a domestic private adoption was also more than
$40,000 in a few cases, about 50% of private

adoptions incurred a cost of less than $10,000 and
about 15% of them paid no cost at all.13
Table 2 shows the characteristics of the adoptive parents.14 The majority of these adoptive parents were couples at the time of adoption. In
about 76% of the cases in international adoptions, the parents were either married or living
together as partners. For foster care and domestic
private adoptions these figures were about 64%
and 61%, respectively. Roughly 50% of the parents who adopted from international markets and
those who adopted from foster care already had
some kids in the household, while only 37% of
the parents who went through private domestic adoptions had some kids. Very few parents
(about 3%) who adopted internationally knew the
adopted child beforehand. However, about 42%
of those who adopted domestically from either
a public facility or the private market had prior
13. We cleaned up the data by dropping no costs for
international and private adoptions. We also adjusted the costs
for foster care adoption with reimbursements. See notes in
Table 1.
14. In this survey, each household is interviewed about an
adopted child. Thus, each case represents each household as
well as each child.
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knowledge of the child. Not surprisingly given
the characteristics of the children, 80% of international adoptions were transracial whereas only a
little more than 20% of respective domestic adoptions were transracial. One of the important variables is parental income which is grouped into
five categories, ranging from at or below 100%
the poverty line to above 400% poverty line.15
More than 60% of parents adopting internationally fell in the fifth category while about 33% of
foster care adoptive parents and 39% of domestic private adoptions fell in this category. As for
employment status, either or both parents were
full-time employed in 89% of the cases in international adoptions, followed by about 72% in
foster care adoptions and 70% in domestic private adoptions.
C. Construction of some of the Variables
In spite of the richness of the data, additional
assumptions and data generations have been
required for our particular analytical approach.
First of all, estimating a mixed logit model
necessitates not only the data for the chosen
alternatives, but also those for the nonchosen
alternatives. This choice of the model requires,
for instance, the costs of adoption that were
actually paid for the chosen alternatives as well
as the costs from other alternatives if they had
been chosen. This is because the choice process
involves comparisons of attributes across alternatives. Given that the revealed preference data
such as NSAP do not provide data for subsidies
and prices for the nonchosen alternatives, we
attempt to estimate the necessary information
based on the characteristics of adopted children
and adoptive parents, assuming that they wish to
adopt a child with specific attributes regardless of
alternatives (i.e., the preferences are assumed to
be constant across alternatives). This assumption
reflects the fact that adoptive placement typically
occurs when an adoptee’s attributes represent a
good match with parents’ preference.16 Second,
15. The poverty level of the household is based on DHHS
Poverty Guidelines. At or below 100% poverty level refers to
income at or below the poverty threshold, above 100% to at
or below 200% poverty level refers to income ranging from
above the poverty threshold to two times the threshold, above
200% to at or below 300% poverty level refers to income
ranging from above two times the threshold to three times
the threshold, above 300% to at or below 400% poverty level
refers to income ranging from above three times the threshold
to four times the threshold, and above 400% poverty line
refers to income above four times the poverty threshold.
16. There may be two possible concerns about this
assumption. First, adoptive parents may not seek a special

when adoptive parents decide on an adoption,
they are faced with not just the adoption cost but
total costs which include the costs of raising the
kid. Thus, we construct the consumer price (net
adoption cost) variable by defining it as adoption
costs plus the present value of future expenses
on raising the child, minus the present value
of subsidy.
To begin, we estimate the subsidies for the
nonchosen foster care alternative based on their
observed choices. The observed category of subsidy is regressed on the adoption year and on
parent and child characteristics, using OLS. The
results are presented in Table 3. The variables
that determine the amount of subsidy in a statistically significant way are adoption year, parents’
income, child’s age, special needs, and the race
dummies including Hispanic, Asian, and Black.
The statistical significance of the race dummies
is consistent with the fact that there are more
African American than Caucasian children waiting to be adopted at foster care facilities. Also,
the importance of parents’ income, child age,
and special needs is consistent with the eligibility of federal or state adoption assistance (see
Child Welfare Information Gateway 2011). We
re-estimate the subsidy regression by only including adoption year, parents’ income, child age,
dummy for special needs and two race dummies.
Then, the equation is used to estimate the subsidy
category for the nonchosen foster care alternative
based on their income and characteristics of the
chosen child. The predicted values, rounded off to
the nearest integer, are obtained to represent the
levels of subsidy that would have been received if
parents who adopted from the international and
domestic private markets had chosen to adopt a
foster child instead. Note that the subsidy is only
provided to foster care adoptions, so it takes value
zero for both alternatives of private adoption.
Next, we estimate the cost of adoption for the
nonchosen alternatives of each adoptive parent.

needs child in particular and they may end up choosing a special needs child for other (idiosyncratic) reason. In fact, NSAP
shows that 35% of parents who adopted special needs children
indicated that either of the parents knew the child before considering adopting and 77% indicated that they received and
reviewed the child’s medical history before adoption. Second, some adoptive parents, specifically gay couples, may
be excluded from potential matches. This information is not
available in our data set. However, this data set contains
postadoption information, which means that any parent who
answered the survey has successfully adopted a child from
one of the alternatives. So, our results may not specifically
apply to cases such as gay couples.
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TABLE 3
Subsidy and Adoption Cost Equations
Subsidy Equations

Adoption Cost Equations

(1)

(2)

(1)
International

0.152***
(0.037)
−0.098**
(0.039)
—

0.053
(0.066)
0.286***
(0.067)
—

−0.180***
(0.028)
0.090***
(0.022)
—

0.088*
(0.051)
0.197***
(0.051)
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Friend used to adopt

—

—

−0.900*
(0.470)
—

0.410***
(0.143)
−0.423***
(0.060)
—

—

Know prior adoption

0.133***
(0.042)
−0.091*
(0.049)
−0.131
(0.175)
0.217
(0.160)
−0.282
(0.286)
—

0.298***
(0.038)
0.219
(0.159)
0.571***
(0.157)
—

0.308***
(0.037)
—
0.656***
(0.151)
—

—

—

0.538*
(0.290)
0.056
(0.204)
2.170*
(1.286)
0.598**
(0.232)
—
No
597
0.628

0.540**
(0.241)

Year of adoption
Income
Couple
Already have kids
Employer’s assistance

Child age
Male
Special needs
Transrace
CPI
Hispanic
Caucasian
Asian
Black
Source country dummies
Stratum dummies
Observations
Adj. R2

−0.148***
(0.046)
0.192
(0.168)
—
0.455**
(0.210)
0.034***
(0.007)
—
—
—

0.581***
(0.189)
—
No
597
0.627

—
Yes
No
485
0.923

(2)
Foster Care

(3)
Domestic Private

−0.141***
(0.016)
0.128**
(0.064)
−0.109*
(0.065)
0.167*
(0.091)
0.024***
(0.003)
−0.109
(0.125)
0.254**
(0.115)
0.184
(0.316)
−0.14
(0.116)
—
Yes
686
0.595

−1.114***
(0.207)
0.467***
(0.162)
−0.122***
(0.038)
−0.108
(0.133)
—
0.155
(0.205)
0.026***
(0.006)
0.09
(0.286)
0.087
(0.248)
0.896
(1.394)
−0.213
(0.282)
—
Yes
563
0.758

Notes: The dependent variable in the subsidy equation is monthly subsidy in category and the dependent variable in the
adoption cost equations is gross adoption cost which includes a home study, travel, and legal fees. It is also a category variable.
These equations are estimated without a constant. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 90%
confidence leve; **significant at the 95% confidence level; ***significant at the 99% confidence level.

Using the observed data of the chosen alternatives, we regress the cost of adoption on both parent and child characteristics for each alternative,
separately. It is to be noted that this cost of adoption for foster care is a gross cost which does not
include subsidy, but is adjusted for some or full
reimbursements. We also add the adoption year
and CPI), in all regressions to capture possible
economy-wide shocks over time.17 We apply a
17. The CPI is taken from World Development Indicators
and OECD Statistics. 2010 is the base year. The CPI for
Africa, Asia, Europe, Central America, South America, and
others (Oceania, North America, and Caribbean) are weighted
by each country’s share of adoption in 1998.

similar procedure as the subsidy regressions. We
drop those parent and child characteristics that
are not statistically significant. The final results
are also presented in Table 3. For international
adoption, we control for the adopted child’s country of birth with source country dummy variables.
This control is to capture both the distance and
the race of the child. So, the race dummies are
not included due to collinearity problems, but
they are included in the foster care and domestic private adoption regressions. The results from
the three regressions show that adoption cost is
determined by parents’ income, prior knowledge
of the child, child age, gender, special needs,
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transrace, and CPI. The income coefficients are
larger for private adoptions (largest for international adoptions) than that for foster child adoption, as expected. Also, across the three alternatives, an adoptive parents’ prior knowledge of the
child significantly reduces the cost of adoption,
and the younger a kid is the more expensive it is to
adopt. The results for the gender coefficient show
that it costs more to adopt a boy than a girl from
the foster care system, while this gender cost gap
is not significant for the private adoption markets.
The results also show that it is more costly
to adopt a transracial child than a child with
the same race and the difference is much larger
for international adoptions. The coefficients of
source country dummies for international adoption indicate that it costs more to adopt a child
from Russia, Guatemala, Other Asia, Europe, or
South America than from China (base group)
while it costs less to adopt from South Korea than
from China.18 The costs of adoption from China,
Africa, or Central America are not statistically
different. On the other hand, for foster care adoptions, it costs more to adopt a Caucasian child
than a Hispanic child (base group); the costs of
adopting other races are not statistically different.
Other notable findings are that those who
receive financial assistance from their employers incur higher costs for foster care adoptions,
while those who adopt a special needs child pay
less. In addition, for domestic private adoption,
those whose friends adopted the same way pay
more. Finally, an increase in CPI raises the costs
of adoption across the three chosen alternatives.
The cost of adoption for the nonchosen alternative is predicted based on the chosen child characteristics and given parent characteristics. For
nonchosen international adoption, we choose the
country of adoption randomly from a uniform
distribution. The predicted values are rounded to
the nearest integers.
Finally, we calculate the consumer prices of
the three possible alternatives for each adoptive parent. The consumer price is the net adoption cost which is defined as the gross adoption
cost plus the present value of future expenses on
raising the child, minus the present value of subsidy. The gross adoption cost was defined earlier to include a home study, travel, legal fees,
and other expenses. Because this consumer price
variable also includes the expenses on raising
the child, there are significant variations in this

variable, which is also driven by the age of the
adopted child. With the same adoption cost and
subsidy, this price is higher for a child adopted at
a younger age than an older one. The categories
for costs of adoption and subsidies are converted
into their mid dollar values as shown in Table 1.
The estimated annual expenditure on a child is
taken from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA). Pairing that with the NSAP data, we
calculate the present value of the cost of raising
a child until he or she reaches the age of 21.19
We choose an annual discount rate of 12% to
calculate the present value of the cost of raising a child and a monthly discount rate of 1%
to calculate the present value of subsidy. It is
also worth noting that the USDA data vary by
parents’ income, child age, year, the number of
the children in a household, and by whether or
not the adoptive parents are couples. Because the
categories differ between the two data sets, we
manage to match them to the extent possible. We
start by identifying whether the adoptive parents
are couples and whether they have a child before
adoption. We further break down those adoptive parents based on their income levels, year of
adoption, and the age of adopted child. Then, the
associated annual cost is assigned accordingly.
Table 4 presents the paired variables for the two
data sets.

18. Coefficients for source country dummies are not
reported to save space.

19. The choice for age at 21 is also consistent with the
subsidy policy of the government.

D. Empirical Results
We estimate the demand function for child
adoption by U.S. parents from the NSAP
who adopted a child from either one of three
alternatives—international, domestic private
and foster care adoption markets. We employ
Train’s (2003) control function approach to deal
with the endogeneity of the price variable. This
approach requires two-stage estimations. The
first step is to estimate the price equations to
extract the residuals which will be included
in the control function in the choice model.
The consumer price in each adoption market
is regressed on all observed parent and child
characteristics and price instruments. Then, the
second step is to estimate the demand equation
using the mixed logit model with the control
function.
In the first stage, as explained in the previous
subsection, we use CPI of the child’s country
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TABLE 4
Pairing NSAP and USDA
NSAP
Questions
Poverty level of the household based on DHHS poverty guidelines

Year of adoption

Child’s age when adoption finalized

Responses

USDA

<100% poverty line
Above 100%–200% poverty line
Above 200%–300% poverty line
Above 300%–400% poverty line
>400% poverty line
1990–1992
1993–1995
1996–1997
1998–2000
2001–2002
2003–2004
2005–2006
2007–2008
0 years
1 year
2 years
3 years
4–5 years
6–7 years
8–10 years
11 years and older

Low income
Low income
Mid income
High income
High income
1991
1994
1996
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
0–2 years
0–2 years
0–2 years
3–5 years
3–5 years
6–8 years
9–11 years
12–14; 15–17 years

Notes: For child age, the last response category is matched with the average cost of raising children aged 12–14 and 15–17
in USDA data.

as the price instrument.20 For the consumer
price of international adoption, we add the sending country dummies to capture travel costs
which also presumably affect the choice through
price but not directly. The results of the price
equations are presented in Table 5. The results
are as expected. For example, the point estimates for household income, which includes the
cost of raising the child up to 21 years old, are
positive and significant at the 99% confidence
level for all alternatives, suggesting that higher
income families pay relatively more, regardless
of alternatives. Obviously, it is more expensive
for higher income families to raise a child.
However, price discrimination, especially among
private agents, may also play a role (Blackstone
et al. 2008; Child Welfare Information Gateway 2011). The point estimates for couples are
negative and statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level for all three regressions. This
20. The CPI variable is averaged according to the range of
adoption years for each respective country. For regions such
as Africa, Asia, Europe, Central America, South America,
and Other, CPI is weighted by the 1998 adoption shares of
countries in each region before being averaged according to
the range of adoption years.

suggests that couples paid less than single parents
overall.
The coefficient for parents already having kids
is negative and significant at the 99% confidence
level for international adoption while they are
insignificant for the other two choices. This suggests that parents who already have kids pay less
than those who do not when adopting from an
international market. On the other hand, the coefficients for employer’s assistance are positive and
significant at the 90% confidence level for domestic adoption while it is not significant for international adoption. This evidence indicates that
adoptive parents who receive employer’s assistance may be willing to spend more on adoption
fee in the U.S. We also find that parent age, having a friend who used to adopt the same way, or
parents’ employment do not have statistically significant effect on the consumer price.
For child characteristics, there are some interesting results that deserve careful explanations.
The estimates for child age are negative and statistically significant for both the domestic alternatives; however, that for the international adoption is not statistically significant. First, this result
is consistent with the fact that an older child
costs less than younger ones to adopt. Second,
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TABLE 5
First-Stage Price Equations for Three Adoption Alternatives
International Adoption

Income
Parent age
Parent age squared
Already have kids
Employer’s assistance
Friend used to adopt
Full-time employed
Couple
Child age
Child age squared
Male
Special needs
Transrace
Waiting time
Pre. val. of subsidy
Russia
South Korea
Africa
Other Asia
Europe
Central America
South America
CPI
Constant
Stratum dummies
Race dummies
Year dummies
Observations
Adj. R2

Foster Care Adoption

Private Domestic Adoption

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

16.3739***
−2.1287
0.0159
−5.1976***
2.4280
2.1751
4.3059
−12.7557***
−0.4927
−0.2847
5.0628***
−1.1544
5.0919**
−0.1251***

(1.0259)
(1.6954)
(0.0200)
(1.6726)
(2.0316)
(1.8897)
(3.0163)
(2.0844)
(1.8231)
(0.2460)
(1.9477)
(1.7024)
(2.2676)
(0.0346)

18.1372***
−0.6421
−0.0004
−0.2846
4.7207*
1.0710
0.9544
−10.7920***
−3.4918**
0.1064
0.2891
−1.0114
0.7023

(0.6087)
(1.1938)
(0.0137)
(1.6848)
(2.4774)
(1.4891)
(2.1839)
(2.0695)
(1.5628)
(0.1704)
(1.4991)
(1.5026)
(2.3258)

17.5998***
−0.6714
0.0027
−0.2846
3.6961*
2.0846
−0.8755
−5.1135***
−6.1328***
0.2094
−2.2301*
0.1609
1.4789

(0.5832)
(1.1124)
(0.0134)
(1.4918)
(1.9971)
(1.4837)
(2.0698)
(1.8776)
(1.6575)
(0.2005)
(1.3110)
(1.3179)
(2.0625)

−0.0010***

(0.0000)

−13.5305**
−6.2147**
−17.8284**
9.3331**
−4.5257
−12.2947*
3.5983
−0.1519
123.0073***
Yes
Yes
Yes
424
0.7447

(6.1517)
(3.0210)
(7.1088)
(3.7455)
(4.8833)
(7.3983)
(4.5571)
(0.0942)
(38.2026)

1.5433***
−54.0319*
Yes
Yes
Yes
558
0.8491

(0.1325)
(27.6015)

1.8788***
−76.1563***
Yes
Yes
Yes
558
0.8041

(0.1247)
(25.5675)

Notes: The dependent variable is net adoption cost (consumer price) which is defined as gross adoption cost plus the present
value of future expenses of raising a child to 21 years old minus the present value of subsidy. The robust standard errors are
in parentheses. *Significant at the 90% confidence level; **significant at the 95% confidence level; ***significant at the 99%
confidence level.

the expenses to raise the kids till the age of
21 years are also less when the child is adopted
at an older age. For the gender of the child,
the estimate is positive and significant at the
99% confidence level for international adoption,
while it is negative and significant at the 90%
confidence level for domestic private adoption.
This result suggests that a boy is more expensive to adopt than a girl for international adoption. This could be due to the fact that discrimination and gender bias against daughters in many
countries such as China, India, South Korea and
many others leave more girls than boys for adoption (Croll 2000; Williamson 1976). The estimates for special needs are not statistically significant, suggesting no price differences between
adopting a child with and without special needs.
The point estimate for transrace is positive and
statistically significant for international adoption while insignificant for the domestic alternatives. This suggests that when adoptive parents

adopt from foreign countries, the adoption price
is higher if both parents and the child belong
to different races. The waiting time variable for
international adoption shows a negative sign that
is statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level, suggesting that the shorter the waiting time
is, the higher is the price. This result is consistent with our theoretical predictions, as given
in Proposition 2. For foster care adoptions, the
variable subsidy also shows a negative sign that
is statistically significant at the 99% confidence
level. This result is straightforward: subsidy helps
reduce the price of adoption including the cost of
raising the child.
For the instrumental variable, CPI, the coefficients are positive and statistically significant for
the two domestic adoption alternatives, indicating the rising cost of adoption and raising a child
over time. The insignificance of CPI coefficient
for international adoptions is not a major problem
because we also use sending country dummies as
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additional instruments and most of them are statistically significant.
As proposed in Train (2003), the residuals
from the price equations of these three adoption markets are extracted to be included in the
mixed logit model as a control function. Table 6
presents the demand equations for child adoption. The variables are listed in three groups:
(1) alternative-specific variables—those that
vary across both cases and alternatives, (2)
case-specific variables—those that vary only
across cases, and (3) the additional variables
that are included to correct for endogeneity. For
comparison among different models, panel 1
reports the parameters estimated from McFadden’s (1974) alternative-specific conditional
logit choice model. Panel 2 reports the parameters estimated from Train’s (2003) mixed logit
model that includes induced error components,
and panel 3 reports the estimated parameters
when the control function approach is applied in
the mixed logit model.
The result of the standard logit model shows
that the price coefficient is −0.0222 and statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. This
price effect is allowed to vary by income groups.
The variation is given by the interaction term
between the consumer price variable and income
groups. The estimated price coefficients from the
first (at or below 100% poverty level) to the
fifth (above 400% poverty level) income group
are −0.0171, −0.0120, −0.0069, −0.0018, and
0.0033, respectively. While the first four coefficients respect the law of demand, the coefficient turns positive for the fifth income group
which contain the majority of cases, making the
model implausible for important policy and welfare analysis.
In the second model, we include two error
components that capture possible correlations
in unobserved utility among domestic adoptions
and among private adoptions. The error component for domestic adoptions is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, indicating
that there is a correlation in unobserved utility
between foster care and domestic private adoptions; however, its standard deviation is not statistically significant, indicating that the correlation does not vary in the population. The result
also shows that the price coefficient is slightly
higher while that for the interaction term remains
unchanged, that is, the problem of non-downward
sloping demand function for the fifth income
group is still not resolved.
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In the third model, we employ the control
function approach where the residuals from the
three price equations estimated in Table 5 are
included. The residual for international adoption
is positive and statistically significant at the 99%
confidence level. This is important because more
than 60% of international adoption cases are
households in the fifth income group and the positive sign of this residual suggests that there are
desirable attributes of international adoption that
are not captured by the previous models. Moreover, the error component for domestic adoption
remains statistically significant.
More importantly, the control function
approach has resolved the non-downward
sloping demand function for the fifth income
group. The estimated price coefficients are all
negative for all five income groups. The estimate for the price coefficient is −0.0184 and
the estimated coefficient of the price-income
interaction term decreases to 0.0033. As a result,
the estimated price coefficients from the first
to fifth income groups are −0.0151, −0.0118,
−0.0085, −0.0052, and −0.0019, respectively.
Therefore, we now have a downward sloping
demand curve for child adoption across different
income groups. The price effects on the demand
decrease as income rises, supporting the conventional wisdom that richer households are less
susceptible to price changes. In particular, households with an income of 400% above the poverty
level are the least responsive to price changes.
Recall that our price variable is a consumer price
which includes the cost of raising a child, so
this price is higher for a younger child. So, the
result for the fifth income group also indicates
that child age is less likely to deter the adoption
demand for richer parents. In other words, the
very rich adoptive parents tend to adopt very
young kids.
We calculate the direct and cross price elasticities from the result of the mixed logit model
with the control function approach. The estimated elasticities which are reported in Table 7,
show that a 1% increase in the consumer price of
international adoption reduces the probability of
adopting a child from an international market by
0.397% while increasing the probability of foster care adoption by 0.118% and that of domestic
private adoption by 0.121%. In addition, a 1%
increase in the consumer price of domestic private adoption reduces the probability of adopting
a child from a domestic private agency by 0.306%
while increasing the probability of international
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TABLE 6
Demand Equations for Child Adoption
(1)
Conditional Logit
Coefficient

SE

(1) Alternative-specific variables
cprice in $1,000
−0.0222*** (0.0054)
cprice × income
0.0051***
(0.0014)
(2) Case-specific variables (foster care adoption is the base group)
(2.a) International adoption
Parent characteristics
Parent age
0.4333**
(0.1755)
Parent age squared
−0.0053*** (0.0020)
Already have kids
−0.2758
(0.1949)
Employer’s assistance
0.9729***
(0.2891)
Friend used to adopt
1.2179***
(0.2085)
Full-time employed
0.2735
(0.2781)
Couple
−0.2791
(0.2413)
Child characteristics
Male
0.0741
(0.1869)
Special needs
−1.1692*** (0.1886)
Transrace
2.9516***
(0.2963)
Asian
6.3160***
(0.7154)
Black
0.4271
(0.4473)
Hispanic
2.0999***
(0.3938)
Caucasian
3.0161***
(0.4329)
Constant
−13.1777*** (3.8191)
(2.b) Private adoption
Parent characteristics
Parent age
−0.0356
(0.1097)
Parent age squared
−0.0001
(0.0013)
Already have kids
−0.7820*** (0.1393)
Employer’s assistance
0.6364***
(0.2368)
Friend used to adopt
−0.0287
(0.1377)
Full-time employed
−0.1461
(0.1838)
Couple
−0.0775
(0.1671)
Child characteristics
Male
0.3797***
(0.1349)
Special needs
−0.8741*** (0.1441)
Transrace
0.0914
(0.1921)
Asian
0.1719
(0.7973)
Black
−0.9182*** (0.2826)
Hispanic
−0.0809
(0.2712)
Caucasian
0.3045
(0.2530)
Constant
2.3805
(2.3736)
(3) Variables to correct for endogeneity
Resid for international adoption
Resid for foster care adoption
Resid for private dom. adoption
Error component for domestic adoption
Error component for private adoption
SD
Error component for domestic adoption
Error component for private adoption
Stratum dummies
Yes
Year dummies
Yes
Log likelihood
−1,112.02
Observations
4,746

(2)
Mixed Logit

(3)
Mixed Logit with Control
Function Approach

Coefficient

SE

Coefficient

SE

−0.0225***
0.0051***

(0.0054)
(0.0014)

−0.0184***
0.0033**

(0.0054)
(0.0015)

0.4342**
−0.0054***
−0.2799
0.9809***
1.2316***
0.2638
−0.2769

(0.1757)
(0.0020)
(0.1954)
(0.2896)
(0.2087)
(0.2787)
(0.2418)

0.3618*
−0.0046*
−0.3293
0.8872***
1.3014***
0.2103
−0.2282

(0.2054)
(0.0024)
(0.2156)
(0.3066)
(0.2285)
(0.3101)
(0.2757)

0.0808
−1.1662***
2.9595***
6.3162***
0.4337
2.1039***
3.0251***

(0.1873)
(0.1892)
(0.2966)
(0.7152)
(0.4479)
(0.3943)
(0.4331)

0.2142
−1.2003***
3.0874***
6.4067***
0.5572
1.1917***
3.2305***

(0.2128)
(0.2063)
(0.3233)
(0.7398)
(0.4872)
(0.4417)
(0.4786)

−0.0341
−0.0001
−0.7843***
0.6452***
−0.0024
−0.1636
−0.0724

(0.1089)
(0.0013)
(0.1389)
(0.2352)
(0.1371)
(0.1833)
(0.1661)

−0.0267
−0.0001
−0.7941***
0.6472***
0.0102
−0.1288
−0.0201

(0.1084)
(0.0012)
(0.1387)
(0.2363)
(0.1367)
(0.1807)
(0.1760)

0.3892***
−0.8661***
0.1011
0.1723
−0.8951***
−0.0771
0.3156

(0.1341)
(0.1430)
(0.1921)
(0.7963)
(0.2803)
(0.2712)
(0.2531)

0.3829***
−0.8357***
0.1306
0.4427
−0.8673***
−0.0475
0.3305

(0.1340)
(0.1413)
(0.1933)
(0.8193)
(0.2791)
(0.2716)
(0.2531)

15.574***
2.4301

(3.7129)
(2.3552)

0.0365***
0.0063
0.0031
13.6615***
2.1916

(0.0102)
(0.0104)
(0.0100)
(4.3167)
(2.3425)

0.0008
0.0539
Yes
Yes
−1,118.58
4,768

(0.0184)
(0.2823)

−0.0049
−0.0013
Yes
Yes
−1,047.94
4,514

(0.0344)
(0.0386)

Notes: (1) reports McFadden’s (1974) alternative-specific conditional logit choice model. (2) reports Train’s (2003) mixed
logit model that includes induced error components. (3) reports the control function approach applied in the mixed logit model.
Foster care adoption is the base group. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 90% confidence level;
**significant at the 95% confidence level; ***significant at the 99% confidence level.
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TABLE 7
Estimated Price Elasticities
Description

Elasticity

Net adoption cost (or consumer price) of international
adoption
Share of international adoption
−0.397
Share of foster care adoption
0.118
Share of domestic private adoption
0.121
Net adoption cost (or consumer price) of domestic private
adoption
Share of international adoption
0.166
Share of foster care adoption
0.163
Share of domestic private adoption
−0.306
Note: These direct and cross price elasticities are calculated from the estimates of the mixed logit model with the
control function approach given in Table 6.

adoption by 0.166% and that of foster care by
0.163%.
We now turn to the observed characteristics
of the adoptive parents in Table 6. The signs and
significance of these variables do not change as
the correction of price endogeneity is made from
model to model, though the magnitudes of the
coefficients change quite a bit. The results show
that parent age has an important implication for
the adoption choices and the relationship is nonlinear. Up to about 39 years of age, older parents
are more likely to go international markets than
domestic ones for adoption; however, as age progresses above 39 years, the likelihood reverses.
Parents who already have kids are less likely to
adopt from domestic private market than from
foster care facilities. With employer’s assistance,
parents are more likely to adopt from the private
markets, either domestic or international, than
from foster care facilities. The results also show
that having a friend who has adopted internationally, is more likely to encourage international
adoption, while it is not significant for domestic
adoptions. Finally, employment status and being
couples are not significant factors determining
adoption choices.
As for the characteristics of the child, gender preference is not the reason why U.S. parents
are going outside the United States for adoption;
however, parents who want a boy are more likely
to use domestic private agents than going to foster care facilities. Also, U.S. adoptive parents are
less likely to adopt a child with special needs
from any private markets than from foster care
facilities. Another interesting result is that transracial adoptions are more likely to happen in the
international market than in the domestic markets
and there is no evidence of transracial adoptions

1773

in the domestic markets, either private or foster
care. When parents want to adopt an Asian, Hispanic, or Caucasian child, they are more likely
to go outside the United States. Finally, adopting
a Black child is more likely to happen at foster
care facilities.
IV. DISCUSSION

A. Waiting Time for International Adoption
We add a new variable, waiting time for international adoption, in the mixed logit model. We
also assume that waiting time for domestic adoptions, both foster care and private markets, is zero
due to the unavailability of data.21 This inclusion
does not significantly affect the results. The result
is presented in panel 1 of Table 8. The inclusion
of waiting time for international adoption only
marginally changes the significance and magnitude of a few variables. Most importantly, the
waiting time variable is negative and statistically
significant as it is expected. The result indicates
that longer waiting time reduces the probability of adoption in the international markets. This
empirical finding is consistent with our theoretical prediction for the demand of international
adoption given in Proposition 2.
The ratio of some of the coefficients to the
coefficient of price provides an economically useful information. That is, all coefficients, especially those associated with parent and child
characteristics, can be expressed in dollar terms.
Since the price variable is measured in thousand
dollars, the dollar coefficients are calculated by
multiplying the ratio of each of the coefficients
to the price coefficient with $1,000. The result is
reported in column WTP in panel 1 of Table 8.
For the waiting time variable, the result shows
that when adopting from international markets,
U.S. adoptive parents are willing to spend $311 to
reduce the waiting time by 1 day. In other words,
it costs an adoptive parent on average $311 to wait
another day for the adoption to finalize. From the
data, adoptive parents waits 224 days to complete
an adoption from China and on average 222 days
to complete an adoption from Russia while they
wait much longer to adopt from other countries
or regions, 258 days from Africa, 313 days from
Europe, and 328 days from South America. That
means, with every other things being the same, an
21. Waiting time is a country-specific macro variable
which is constant for all adoptions from a specific country.
This variable is missing for Guatamala possibly due to problems of corruption and coercion in this market during the time.
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TABLE 8
Demand for Child Adoption and Willingness to Pay (WTP)
Mixed Logit with Control Function Approach
(1)
Coefficient

SE

(1) Alternative-specific variables
cprice in $1,000
−0.0185***
(0.0054)
cprice × income
0.0031**
(0.0014)
Waiting time
−0.0057***
(0.0018)
(2) Case-specific variables (foster care adoption is the base group)
(2.a) International adoption
Parent characteristics
Parent age
0.3497*
(0.2049)
Parent age squared
−0.0045*
(0.0024)
Already have kids
−0.3368
(0.2150)
Employer’s assistance
0.8369***
(0.3049)
Friend used to adopt
1.3520***
(0.2311)
Full-time employed
0.1991
(0.3084)
Couple
−0.2409
(0.2761)
Child characteristics
Male
0.2166
(0.2136)
Special needs
−1.2069***
(0.2086)
Transrace
3.0374***
(0.3200)
Asian
6.4102***
(0.7377)
Black
0.5843
(0.4854)
Hispanic
1.1968***
(0.4440)
Caucasian
3.1577***
(0.4742)
ParentsNonBlackChildDiffRace
–
NonBlackParentBlackChild
–
(2.b) Private adoption
Parent characteristics
Parent age
−0.0250
(0.1086)
Parent age squared
−0.0002
(0.0013)
Already have kids
−0.7961***
(0.1389)
Employer’s assistance
0.6454***
(0.2357)
Friend used to adopt
0.0107
(0.1367)
Full-time employed
−0.1278
(0.1808)
Couple
−0.0131
(0.1762)
Child characteristics
Male
0.3847***
(0.1342)
Special needs
−0.8319***
(0.1411)
Transrace
0.1384
(0.1938)
Asian
0.5096
(0.8163)
Black
−0.8611***
(0.2787)
Hispanic
−0.0452
(0.2720)
Caucasian
0.3375
(0.2534)
ParentNonBlackChildDiffRace
–
NonBlackParentBlackChild
–
(3) Variables to correct for endogeneity
Resid for international adoption
0.0385***
(0.0102)
Resid for foster care adoption
0.0075
(0.0104)
Resid for private dom. adoption
0.0042
(0.0099)
Error component for domestic adoption
11.5234***
(4.3191)
Error component for private adoption
2.1492
(2.3474)
SD
Error component for domestic adoption
−0.0019
(0.0235)
Error component for private adoption
−0.0012
(0.0326)
Stratum dummies
Yes
Year dummies
Yes
Log likelihood
−1,042.25
Observations
4,514

(2)
WTP

Coefficient

SE

WTP

−$1,000
169
−311

−0.0183***
0.0030**
−0.0055***

(0.0054)
(0.0014)
(0.0018)

−$1,000
164
−301

18,951
−243
−18,250
45,354
73,267
10,791
−13,057

0.3432*
−0.0044*
−0.3272
0.8652***
1.3557***
0.2094
−0.2124

(0.2065)
(0.0024)
(0.2140)
(0.3037)
(0.2332)
(0.3098)
(0.2756)

18,772
−241
−17,895
47,318
74,149
11,455
−11,619

11,737
−65,407
164,603
347,388
31,664
64,859
171,125

0.2364
−1.2195***
–
6.5036***
1.4056*
1.2150***
3.2949***
3.1892***
2.2815***

(0.2154)
(0.2109)

12,931
−66,697

(0.7442)
(0.7478)
(0.4420)
(0.4840)
(0.3484)
(0.6517)

355,700
76,874
66,450
180,211
174,425
124,780

−1,356
−9
−43,143
34,978
583
−6,924
−712

−0.0276
−0.0001
−0.8007***
0.6457***
0.0090
−0.1314
−0.0171

(0.1091)
(0.0013)
(0.1392)
(0.2362)
(0.1371)
0.1813
(0.1780)

−1,511
−7
−43,794
35,314
490
−7,185
−934

20,851
−45,083
7,502
27,614
−46,667
−2,449
18,290

0.3830***
−0.8293***
–
0.5068
−1.0618***
−0.0564
0.2647
0.0369
0.4536

(0.1346)
(0.1411)

20,948
−45,357

(0.8216)
(0.3515)
(0.2726)
(0.2730)
(0.2422)
(0.3522)

27,717
−58,071
−3,085
14,479
2,019
24,811

0.0393***
0.0090
0.0051
11.7426***
2.2812

(0.0102)
(0.0104)
(0.0100)
(4.3798)
(2.3609)

−0.0053
−0.0018
Yes
Yes
−1,039.97
4,514

(0.0285)
(0.0323)

Notes: ParentNonBlackChildDiffRace denotes a dummy variale for parents adopting a non-Black child, which is equal to 1
for Transrace = 1 and Black = 0. NonBlackParentBlackChild denotes a dummy variable for non-Black parents adopting a Black
child, which is equal to 1 for Transrace = 1 and Black = 1. Foster care adoption is the base group. The robust standard errors
are in parentheses. *Significant at the 90% confidence level; **significant at the 95% confidence level; ***significant at the 99%
confidence level.
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adoptive parent is willing to spend about $30,000
more adopting from China or Russia than from
Europe or South America.
B. Adoption Choices and Preferences over
Child Characteristics
Gender. Before discussing the result from our
mixed logit model, it is important to recall that in
our data set there are more girls than boys adopted
from outside the United Ststes, while the gender
compositions for the domestic private adoption
market and foster care adoption are about even.
Girls made up about 67% of the 545 cases of
international adoptions in the survey.22 However,
the result from panel 1 of Table 8 shows that there
is no significant preference of adoptive parents
for girls over boys in the international market,
ceteris paribus. That is, if we consider parents
with the same characteristics and the child also
with the similar characteristics, adoptive parents
are indifferent between the two sexes. This result
is striking given the imbalance we observed in
the data itself and it is also important to remind
ourselves that other factors may also influence
adoption decisions.
On the other hand, while the survey data show
that there are approximately the same gender mix
for domestic adoptions, the mixed logit result
(under panel 1 of Table 8) indicates that with
everything else (including the characteristics of
the adoptive parents and other characteristics of
the child) being the same, adoptive parents show
significant preference for a boy in the domestic private market and are willing to pay more.
The difference in this willingness to pay is economically large. Adoptive parents are willing to
pay around $20,000 more for an adoption of
a boy rather than a girl from a domestic private agency relative to a foster care facility,
ceteris paribus. This preference for boys in the
private adoption market is consistent with the
well-documented evidence in the study of preferences over the gender of biological children.
Dahl and Moretti (2008) find that having a firstborn son reduces the odds of women to remarry,
of a couple to divorce, and of a family to have
more kids. However, in the study of adoption
matching, Baccara et al. (2014) find that a nonAfrican American girl is more likely to receive
22. This number seems consistent with that reported in
the news as being calculated from the data of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2004/01/why-do-adoptive-parents-prefer-girls
.html).
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an application than a non-African American boy,
but there is no significant difference in gender
preferences for the adoption of African American
children.23
Race. Homophily, or that birds of a same feather
flock together, has been well documented in
social network studies (see Ibarra 1992; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). This phenomenon suggests that adoptive parents tend
to adopt a child of a similar race, so that the
kid appears as their biological child. Baccara
et al. (2014) use a matching data set to show
that there is a desirability of Caucasian parents
in adopting non-African American children over
African American children. These parents are
willing to pay $37,639 more in finalization costs.
However, they also fail to provide evidence for a
racial preference for or against adopting Hispanic
children. Our data set with parents of different
races and different adoption alternatives provides
richer results.
Our result from panel 1 of Table 8 shows
that U.S. adoptive parents who desire a child
of a different race are more likely to choose
international adoption relative to foster care. On
average, adoptive parents are willing to pay an
additional $164,603 to adopt a child of different
race outside the United States relative to the foster
care. Additional evidence from the race dummy
variables shows that in the international market
relative to foster care, an Asian child costs an
additional $347,388 to adopt which is followed
by a Caucasian child at an additional $171,125
and a Hispanic child at an additional $64,859.
When we compare private and foster care
adoptions, the insignificant transrace coefficient
suggests that there is no evidence that U.S. parents are willing to pay any additional amount to
adopt a child of a different race. Moreover, the
result from the race dummy variables shows that
while there is no willingness to pay more for
an Asian, Hispanic, or Caucasian child between
the two domestic adoption options, adopting a
Black child from domestic private adoption is
associated with costs that are $46,667 lower than
adopting from a foster care facility. The less
desirability to adopt a Black child in the private
23. It is not easy to draw an explanation for such inconsistency between our result and that of Baccara et al. (2014)
given the differences in the nature of data and the methodology applied. Although it may not be the important reason, an
interesting thing to note is that the data set used in Baccara
et al. (2014) also consists of an unknown gender group and
does not include adoptive parents’ characteristics.
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domestic market is consistent with findings by
Baccara et al. (2014).
While the evidence suggests that there is
homophily in the domestic market, it does not
account for parents’ preferences for the same race
in general because parents who desire a child of
different race are willing to pay more to adopt
from an international market given the alternatives. With the abundance of African American
children in foster care, the question is whether
or not the preference for a child of different race
in the international adoption market may be a
case of a specific aversion toward Black children
in foster care. To test this, we examine if the
transracial adoptions in the international market
are driven by the preferences not only of parents
adopting a non-Black child of different race, but
also of non-Black parents adopting a Black child.
Using the Transrace and Black variables, we construct two dummy variables24 :
1. Parents adopting a non-Black child of
different race (ParentNonBlackChildDiffRace),
which is equal to 1 for both parents and child
having different race (Transrace = 1) and the
adopted child is non-Black (Black = 0), and
zero, otherwise. This category constitutes 34%
in the sample. Examples of this category include
Caucasian parents adopting an Asian child, Black
parents adopting a Hispanic child, or Hispanic
parents adopting a Caucasian child.
2. Non-Black parents adopting a Black child
(NonBlackParentBlackChild), which is equal to
1 for both parents and child having different race
(Transrace = 1) and the adopted child is Black
(Black = 1), and zero, otherwise. This category
constitutes about 5% of the sample.
To test the above-stated hypothesis, we reestimate the mixed logit model by including
dummy variables (1) ParentNonBlackChildDiffRace and (2) NonBlackParentBlackChild,
and excluding Transrace to avoid multicollinearity. The result reported in panel 2 of Table 8
shows that parents adopting a non-Black child of
different race from their own are more likely to
do so in the international market than from a foster care and they are willing to pay an additional
$174,425. Similarly, non-Black parents adopting
a Black child are also more likely to do so in
the international market than a foster care. They
are willing to pay an additional $124,780. This
24. From the data, we know the race of the child, but not
of the adopting parents. However, the variable Transrace tells
us if the adoption was transracial.

evidence provides support for the conjecture
that there is a case of a specific aversion toward
African American children in foster care.
Special Needs. Some children who are relinquished for adoption, especially in the foster care
facility, tend to have some special needs including
physical and/or mental disabilities. To get a child
with special needs adopted has been a challenge
and government policies such as subsidies have
been used to get these children to a foster home
and finally to a permanent home. In our data,
the monthly subsidy ranges from a mid value of
$150 to more than $1,000. One of the first studies
that examines the adoption data of special needs
children in the state of New York in 1990 shows
that subsidy does not increase the adoption placement rate, except for children with mental disabilities (Avery and Mont 1992). However, two
other studies, although they do not consider special needs children specifically, find that subsidy
affects adoption rates positively. Using state level
data, Hansen (2007) shows that an increase in
monthly subsidy by $100 results in an additional
80 children adopted in a state in a fiscal year.
On the other hand, Duncan and Argys (2007) use
individual-level data of children entering foster
care in 1998 and show that a $100 increase in
subsidy reduces the number of children placed
in group homes by 28.7%, with more children
going to nonrelative foster homes than relative
homes.
Our result from panel 1 of Table 8 shows that
adoptive parents are less likely to adopt a special needs child. When adoptive parents want to
adopt a special needs child, they are less likely
to choose international or private adoptions than
foster care. Put in monetary terms, the willingness to pay for international adoption of a special
needs child is $65,407 less relative to foster care
adoption and that for private adoption is $45,083
less. Because our consumer price includes the
cost of raising a child, this result may not be a surprise if the child adopted from international and
private agencies is older than the child adopted
from foster care. However, in our data the average age of a special needs child adopted from
international markets is 2.5 years old and from
private domestic markets is 2.8 years old compared to 4.3 years old from a foster care. We
think that this result is very interesting. Using
an average age of a special needs child at 2.5,
the decrease in consumer price can be translated into an equivalent monthly subsidy payment
of $735 for international adoption and $506 for
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TABLE 9
Tobit Results: Subsidy and Adoption Cost Equations
Subsidy Equation

Year of adoption
Income

(1)
International

(2)
Foster Care

(3)
Domestic Private

0.277***
(0.069)
−0.192**
(0.086)

0.379***
(0.061)
0.207***
(0.079)
−0.129
(0.189)
−0.999*
(0.547)
0.037
(0.173)
−0.133***
(0.048)
0.135
(0.163)
−0.002
(0.169)
0.484**
(0.231)
−0.003
(0.006)
0.708**
(0.289)
−1.972***
(0.325)
−1.177***
(0.230)
−1.094***
(0.421)
2.847***
(0.562)
Yes
482

−0.079
(0.735)
0.256***
(0.066)
0.836**
(0.326)
−1.041***
(0.193)
0.200
(0.178)
−0.318***
(0.050)
0.277
(0.176)
−0.233
(0.180)
0.515**
(0.254)
−0.020
(0.156)
0.986***
(0.326)
−0.067
(0.321)
0.626
(0.642)
0.118
(0.327)
1.979
(9.039)
Yes
664

−0.165
(0.927)
0.403***
(0.102)
0.204
(0.292)
−2.338***
(0.460)
0.959***
(0.250)
−0.244***
(0.088)
−0.136
(0.223)
0.099
(0.226)
0.311
(0.329)
0.099
(0.197)
0.100
(0.356)
−0.586
(0.412)
1.206
(1.851)
0.081
(0.447)
−5.766
(11.402)
Yes
561

Employer’s assistance
Know prior adoption
Friend used to adopt
Child age

0.508***
(0.058)

Male
Special needs

1.016***
(0.237)

Transrace
CPI
Caucasian
Black
Asian
Others
Constant
Stratum dummies
Observations

Adoption Cost Equations

(2)
Foster Care

−0.942***
(0.357)
0.123
(0.392)
1.884
(2.245)
−1.055**
(0.436)
−0.761
(0.748)
Yes
597

Notes: The dependent variable in the subsidy equation is monthly subsidy in category and the dependent variable in the
adoption cost equations is gross adoption cost which includes a home study, travel, and legal fees. It is also a category variable.
The subsidy equation is censored between 0 and 7; the adoption cost equation for international and domstic private adoptions
is censored between 1 and 9; and the adoption cost equation for nonchosen foster care is censored between 0 and 3. The
robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 90% confidence level; **significant at the 95% confidence level;
***significant at the 99% confidence level.

In order to estimate the choice model, our data
necessitated generating observations on variables
for the nonchosen alternatives. In the empirical
section above, we use an OLS estimation method
to estimate two variables, namely, subsidy for
nonchosen foster care adoptions and adoption
costs for the three nonchosen alternatives. In

this section, we perform a robustness test by reestimating the values of the two variables using a
Tobit estimation method. The Tobit model allows
us to censor both the upper and lower limits of
the dependent variables, and this may be important as some of our variables are categorical. The
subsidy equation is censored between 0 and 7;
the adoption cost equations for international and
domestic private adoptions are censored between
1 and 9; and the adoption cost equation for
foster care is censored between 0 and 3. The
results of the Tobit model are presented in Table 9
and they are largely unchanged.26 For the subsidy equation, household income, child age, and

25. This subsidy payment should increase with the age of
the special needs child.

26. Different from the OLS result, the adoption cost
equation for international adoptions includes race dummies

private domestic adoption.25 This result is consistent with our theoretical prediction about government subsidy given in Proposition 1.
V.

ROBUSTNESS TESTS
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special needs are still the important determinants
of monthly subsidy payments. For the adoption
cost equations, household income, prior knowledge of the child, child age, and transrace are the
main determinants of adoption costs.
The Tobit equations are used to estimate the
categorical values of subsidy and adoption costs
for the nonchosen alternative, which are then
used to calculate the consumer price (net adoption cost) to be used in the mixed logit regression. We estimated two equations of the mixed
logit model with control functions. The results
are presented in Table 10. In panel 1, the same
set of instrumental variables as those in the main
results (Table 8) is used while in panel 2 the distance between the United States and the sending
countries is used in place of the sending country dummies due to possible concerns that parents might favor certain countries, thus violating
the exclusion restriction assumption of the instrumental variables.
Overall, the results are consistent with the
main findings. The signs of the coefficients
and their statistical significance remain largely
the same although the estimated willingness
to pay for some of the explanatory variables
differs slightly. Although all three included
residuals from the consumer price equations
are not statistically significant, the downwardsloping demand curves for all income groups
remain valid. In fact, the larger price coefficients
make the demand curves more elastic for all
the income groups. The error component for
domestic adoption which is included to correct
for the iia problem remains significant.
Because our results rely on the estimated values of subsidy and adoption costs for the nonchosen alternatives, one has to be cautious in
interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients.
For instance, the cost associated with waiting for
another day for international adoption is equivalent to $239 in panel 1 or $227 in panel 2,
compared to $311 in the main results (see panel
1 of Table 8). For a child with special needs
aged 2.5 years old, the additional monthly subsidy needed to make a prospective parent indifferent between international and foster care adoptions is $549 in panel 1 or $611 in panel 2, and
between domestic private and foster care adoptions the figure is $386 in panel 1 or $414 in
panel 2, compared to $735 and $506 in the main
results, respectively.
rather than source country dummies; however, these two
variables are very highly correlated.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Every year, 10 of thousands of children are
adopted by U.S. parents either domestically or
internationally through public or private agencies. As adoptions for the most part are driven by
the demand for children rather than by humanitarian response to the need for homes, parents
choose an adoption alternative which offers them
the desired attributes of a child that they seek.
Even though there is an oversupply of adoptable children in the U.S. foster care system, the
demand for adoption through private agencies is
huge, relatively speaking. Thanks to the availability of seemingly countless sending countries to
adopt from, age, gender and race preferences may
well be reflected in their selected adoption destinations where supply is abundant. Foster children, on the other hand, are more likely to have
been abused or neglected and many of them have
special needs, and therefore less advantaged characteristics might deter potential adoptive parents.
After all, it is conceivable that prospective parents
would always prefer a child with more “desirable
attributes.”
In this paper, we model the demand for U.S.
child adoptions under a framework of vertical
product differentiation. With the assumption that
parents are identical in preferences but heterogeneous in income, we derive demand functions where high income families opt for private, domestic or international, adoptions while
low income parents choose to adopt from foster
care. By studying adoption subsidy and waitingtime costs, we establish two theoretical propositions. The first is that an increase in adoption
subsidy encourages more foster care adoption at
the expense of other adoption alternatives. Second, an increase in the cost associated with waiting time in private adoption decreases its demand,
leading to higher demand for public adoption.
The paper is mostly empirical and applies discrete choice regression models to jointly estimate demand for the three adoption alternatives:
international, domestic foster care, and domestic private adoptions. Our analysis addresses the
issue of endogeneity of adoption price (net cost
of adoption) using the control function approach
and allows for potential correlations in unobserved utility over alternatives using a mixed logit
model. We use data from the NSAP, the first
and the only nationally representative sample of
adopted children in the United States. The results
unambiguously reveal a conventional downwardsloping demand of adoption when the unobserved
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TABLE 10
Robustness Tests: Demand for Child Adoption
Mixed Logit with Control Function Approach
(1)
Coefficient

SE

(1) Alternative-specific variables
cprice in $1,000
−0.0233***
(0.0054)
cprice × income
0.0032**
(0.0014)
Waiting time
−0.0056***
(0.0018)
(2) Case-specific variables (foster care adoption is the base group)
(2.a) International adoption
Parent characteristics
Parent age
0.3794*
(0.1990)
Parent age squared
−0.0048**
(0.0023)
Already have kids
−0.2703
(0.2149)
Employer’s assistance
0.8673***
(0.3068)
Friend used to adopt
1.3036***
(0.2284)
Full-time employed
0.1736
(0.3041)
Couple
−0.2052
(0.2723)
Child characteristics
Male
0.1484
(0.2091)
Special needs
−1.1388***
(0.2049)
Transrace
3.0155***
(0.3178)
Asian
6.5152***
(0.7742)
Black
0.6797
(0.4718)
Hispanic
1.2610***
(0.4454)
Caucasian
3.1018***
(0.4624)
(2.b) Private adoption
Parent characteristics
Parent age
−0.0314
(0.1091)
Parent age squared
−0.0001
(0.0013)
Already have kids
−0.7920***
(0.1392)
Employer’s assistance
0.6456***
(0.2353)
Friend used to adopt
0.0184
(0.1371)
Full-time employed
−0.1123
(0.1816)
Couple
−0.0720
(0.1793)
Child characteristics
Male
0.3933***
(0.1350)
Special needs
−0.8005***
(0.1407)
Transrace
0.1236
(0.1930)
Asian
0.5429
(0.8517)
Black
−0.8161***
(0.2789)
Hispanic
−0.0196
(0.2712)
Caucasian
0.3279
(0.2531)
(3) Variables to correct for endogeneity
Resid for international adoption
0.0136
(0.0109)
Resid for foster care adoption
−0.0010
(0.0107)
Resid for private dom. adoption
−0.0018
(0.0103)
Error component for domestic adoption
12.4165***
(4.1899)
Error component for private adoption
2.4131
(2.3577)
SD
Error component for domestic adoption
−0.0016
(0.0225)
Error component for private adoption
−0.0018
(0.0382)
Stratum dummies
Yes
Year dummies
Yes
Log likelihood
−1,049.73
Observations
4,514

(2)
WTP

Coefficient

SE

WTP

−$1,000
136
−239

−0.0218***
0.0028*
−0.0050**

(0.0055)
(0.0050)
(0.0020)

−$1,000
127
−227

16,279
−206
−11,599
37,216
55,935
7,451
−8,806

0.4502**
−0.0055**
−0.2028
1.1778***
1.3159***
0.2318
−0.0746

(0.2220)
(0.0026)
(0.2267)
(0.3065)
(0.2438)
(0.3273)
(0.3044)

20,658
−253
−9,303
54,041
60,375
10,637
−3,424

6,369
−48,862
129,389
279,553
29,164
54,105
133,091

0.1475
−1.1850***
3.3352***
7.0710***
0.3523
1.6809***
3.6656***

(0.2198)
(0.2164)
(0.3424)
(0.7564)
(0.5720)
(0.4756)
(0.5205)

6,769
−54,369
153,025
324,427
16,162
77,122
168,184

−1,348
−3
−33,983
27,702
789
−4,818
−3,091

−0.0290
−0.0001
−0.7979***
0.6716***
0.0203
−0.1009**
−0.0703

(0.1090)
(0.0013)
(0.1391)
(0.2367)
(0.1370)
(0.1818)
(0.1788)

−1,329
−4
−36,607
30,814
932
−4,629
−3,225

16,875
−34,350
5,302
23,293
−35,017
−840
14,069

0.3947***
−0.8040***
0.1291
0.4251
−0.8206***
−0.0224
0.3262

(0.1354)
(0.1403)
(0.1948)
(0.8963)
(0.2771)
(0.2715)
(0.2546)

18,107
−36,888
5,924
19,503
−37,648
−1,026
14,966

0.0144
−0.0010
−0.0018
14.8675***
2.3643

(0.0111)
(0.0109)
(0.0105)
(4.7316)
(2.3565)

0.0179
−0.0406
Yes
Yes
−1,002.09
4,365

(0.0312)
(0.0387)

Notes: In (1), the same set of instrumental variables as those in the main results (Table 8) is used while in (2) the distance
between the United States and the sending countries is used in place of the sending country dummies. Foster care adoption is
the base group. The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at the 90% confidence level; **significant at the 95%
confidence level; ***significant at the 99% confidence level.
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attributes are accounted for and the correlations
in unobserved utility are allowed. The estimates
of the price elasticities show that a 1 % increase
in the consumer price of international adoption reduces the probability of adopting a child
from an international market by 0.397%, while
increasing the probability of foster care adoption
by 0.118% and that of domestic private adoption by 0.121%. A 1 % increase in the consumer
price of domestic private adoption reduces the
probability of adopting a child from a domestic
private agency by 0.306%, while increasing the
probability of international adoption by 0.166%
and that of foster care by 0.163%. In addition,
the model leads to the sensible finding that the
demand slope is diminishing in income, suggesting that higher income families are less sensitive
to a price increase.
The results also provide a few other very interesting findings that have important policy implications. First, consistent with our theoretical prediction, the results show that a longer waiting
time reduces the probability that an adoptive parent chooses international markets as an adoption
alternative. They are willing to spend $311 to
reduce the waiting time by 1 day. Second, we find
evidence that there is a preference for boys over
girls and that prospective parents who want to
adopt a boy are more likely to go to a domestic private agency than a foster care facility; the
additional associated cost is a little more than
$20,000. Third, interestingly we find that adoptive parents who already have kids are less likely
to adopt from a domestic private market than
from a foster care; they are willing to pay $43,000
less. This should suggest that the federal policy to find permanent home for foster children
could be designed to target adoptive parents with
kids in the family. Fourth, we find no evidence of
significant transracial adoptions in the domestic
markets; however, transracial adoptions are more
likely to happen in the international market. Even
non-Black parents who want to adopt a Black
child are more likely to do so in the international
market and they are willing to pay an additional
$120,000. However, the encouraging evidence is
that between the two domestic adoption options,
parents who want to adopt a Black child are less
likely to adopt from a private market than a foster
care; they are willing to pay about $46,000 less
in the domestic private market.
Finally, there is also evidence that a special
needs child is less likely to be adopted. When a
special needs child is adopted, parents pay about
$65,000 less adopting from outside the United

States or $45,000 less adopting from a domestic
private agent, relative to the cost of adopting a
special needs child from a foster care facility.
These costs can be translated into a monthly
subsidy which is used as a policy to encourage
foster care adoption. Given that the average age
of a special needs child is 2.5 years, the results
suggest that the government needs to pay an
additional $735 a month (or $8,900 a year) to
make a parent feel indifferent between choosing
international and foster care adoptions or an
additional $506 a month (or $6,200 a year) to
make a parent feel indifferent between choosing domestic private and foster care adoptions.
According to Zill (2011), for the fiscal year 2010,
the total of maintenance and administrative costs
per child per year in foster care facilities was
estimated at $25,782, while the total of adoption
assistance payments and administrative costs per
child per year was estimated at $10,302. Based
on these estimates, our proposal for increased
subsidy would still cost less to the government to get a 2.5 year-old special needs child
adopted than keeping the child in the foster care
facility.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF DOWNWARD-SLOPING
DEMAND FUNCTIONS
Totally differentiating (4) and (5), and solving for dp1 and
dp2 , we get:
(A1) dp1 = −

u1 − u0 d
u − u0 d
f
(dx2 + dx2 ) − 1
dx1 + ds,
u1
u1

(A2)

[
]
(1 − γ)u2 − u0
f
f
+ φ(1 − x2d − x2 ) (dxd2 + dx2 )
dp2 = −
u2
u − u0 d
f
− 1
dx1 − (1 − x2d − x2 )dϕ.
u2
Thus,

f,

∂p2
∂x2i

=

u −u
∂p1
= − 1u 0 < 0 for all u1 > u0
∂x1d
1
(1−γ)u2 −u0
f
−
+ φ(1 − x2d − x2 ) < 0
u2

while for i = d,
f

if x2d + x2 > 12 ,

which is consistent with the data. The proportion of private
adoption in our sample is more than 63%.

APPENDIX B: COMPARATIVE STATICS
Totally differentiating (9) and (10), together with (A1) and
(A2), we can write the system in the following matrix form:
0
⎡dp1 ⎤ ⎡
⎢dp2 ⎥ ⎢ −(1 − xd − xf )
2
2
⎢ d⎥ ⎢
0
A ⎢dx1 ⎥ = ⎢
d
⎢dx2 ⎥ ⎢−(1 − θ2 )(x2d + x2f )
⎢dxf ⎥ ⎢
f
⎣ 2 ⎦ ⎣−(1 − θ2 )(x2d + x2 )

1⎤
0⎥ [ ]
⎥
0⎥ dϕ ,
ds
0⎥
⎥
0⎦
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f

where the determinant of the coefficient matrix
|1
|
|
|
|0
|
|
|
|
A = ||1
|
|0
|
|
|
|
|0
|
|

∂p

0

− d1
∂x

u

− d2
∂x

1
∂p1
2 ∂xd
1
Ωd1

0
1

0

1

0

∂p

− d1
∂x

1
∂p

− u1

1

|
|
|
1
|
∂p2
|
− d
|
|
∂x
|
2
|
0
|
|
|
|
(1 − θ2 )Δ2
|
|
|
∂2 C2 |
(1 − θ2 )Δ2 − f ||
∂(x )2 |
2
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(1 − θ2 )Δ2 −
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where

∂2 p2
(xd
∂(x2i )2 2
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∂p
(1 − θ1 ) d1
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−

∂p2
∂x2i

f

+ x2 ) +

<0

Ωd1 =

and

Using Cramer’s rule gives the following comparative statics.
B.1. Adoption Subsidy
(
(1 − θ2 )Δ2 +

dxd1

=

ds
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2
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A
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f

dx2
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ds
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A
(
[
) ]
∂p
Ωd1 Ψ2 − (1 − θ2 )Δ2 + d2 Λ2
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=
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ds
A
u ∂p (1 − θ2 )Δ2 Λ2 − Ψ2
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= 1 d1
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ds
u2 ∂x
A
1

where Λ2 =

∂2 C2
f

∂(x2 )2

+

∂2 C2
∂(x2d )2

and Ψ2 =

∂2 C2 ∂2 C2
.
∂(x2d )2 ∂(xf )2
2

B.2. Cost Associated with Waiting Time
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< 0,

f

where (2 − θ2 )(x2d + x2 ) − 1 < 0 given x2d + x2 >
0 < 𝜃 2 < 1.

1
2

and
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